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Consequently, my approach need not suppose from the outset that the Self is truly knowable in its essence or, indeed, that any existing theories of the mind faithfully model consciousness.
Umorismo is not merely a description of the Self but, more significantly, an attempt to transform psychological theory into artistic practice. Pirandello was not alone in asserting the psychological profundity of laughter. Just three years before he wrote his essay, Freud argued that jokes open the door to the unconscious by expressing, in socially acceptable form, libidinal or aggressive thoughts that are normally suppressed.6 On the other hand, Pirandello is quite original in proposing that humor can be rigorously defined as an aesthetic concept. L'umorismo attacks Benedetto Croce's article of 1903 which asserts that humor is a psychological state having nothing directly to do with art making.7 Clamorously rejecting this claim, and Crocean aesthetics in general, Pirandello responds that "l'artista, in fondo, non fa altro che definire e rappresentare stati psicologici" [at bottom, the artist does nothing but define and represent psychological states] (124).8 This assertion is borne out in his texts where the nexus of art and psychology lands squarely on the problematic epistemology of the Self. Simply stated: how does the Self know and recognize the Self? Pirandello's answer is that the Self becomes the artist and attempts to represent itself to itself. The mechanical and rhetorical analogy for this self-representation is the mirror image, for it is here that his characters reveal and confront their unsuccessful efforts to create a coherent, integrated Self. The Pirandellian mirror is a visual analogy for the self-consciousness and the self-estrangement inherent in umorismo. Since Pirandello is trying to represent the distancing and detachment of the Self from itself, it is appropriate that, of all the senses, he privileges sight, the most abstract and cerebral one.
Several critics have compared umorismo to Jacques Lacan's theory of the "mirror stage," a period of psychological development in which the infant begins to recognize a distinction between its own body and the outside world.9 While the child experiences acutely its inability to control its limbs, the sight of its image in the mirror, which appears unified and in control, contributes to the formation of self-identity by means of an imaginary correspondence between Self and image. This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursing dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject. (2) But if Lacan's description of this pre-oedipal stage is useful in regard to umorismo, it is only as a counter-example of psychological functioning. The child's false sense of integrity, its misperception that its reflected image is its body, is exactly the opposite of the estrangement Pirandello's characters experience when gazing upon themselves. While the "mirror stage" comes in infancy before the Self "is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other" and thus "before its social determination" (2), the Pirandellian mirror reveals the socialized individual in the process of fleeing from society. Any number of Pirandello's protagonists effectively isolate themselves from the world: from Mattia Pascal to Enrico IV, from Serafino Gubbio to Vitangelo Moscarda.10
Another interpretation of the essay gaining currency, although without compelling reasons, suggests that umorismo, with its multiple angles of perception, is a Bakhtinian or dialogic form of art.1' However, since Bakhtin held that social and class relations are dialectical, a comparison between his thought and umorismo sheds little light on Pirandello's ahistorical notion of the Self, which operates on the assumption that the human mind has a structural quality (the split Self) unaffected by external events. Pirandello makes a minimal effort to historicize umorismo, claiming that Copernicus, the sixteenth-century astronomer, was "uno dei pifu grandi umoristi, senza saperlo" [one of the greatest humorists without knowing it] (156) because he punctured our inflated notion of humanity, thus changing forever our self-perception. But, on closer inspection, we see that Pirandello's argument barely touches on the evolution of modern society and its impact on the individual, while he dwells at length on the nature of the individual mind. Moreover, he proposes no solution to the "crisis of modern consciousness," nor does he theorize the possibility of one, instead electing only to represent the psyche's turmoil by means of umorismo. Far from responding to Pirandello's sense of crisis, Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist argue that Bakhtin's dialogism celebrates alterity: it is a merry science, afriliche Wissenschaft of the other. As the world needs my alterity to give it meaning, I need the authority of others to define, or author, myself .... The fact that we can never achieve full presence, a unitaryidentity complete in itself, either in immediate experience of ourselves or in the logical rigors of dialectical thought, is not to be lamented. (65-6) In a rarely cited article on L'umorismo, Umberto Eco argues convincingly that Pirandello does a very poor job indeed of defining humor because his definition is far too inclusive, such that the essay could be titled "Everything (but Nothing Else)" (165). However, after this joke and a few others, Eco offers his own original observation: that the real essence of Pirandello's umorismo is most cogently stated by someone else-by Brecht, when discussing his concept of alienation, Verfremdung. According to Eco, the Brechtian artist adopts the following strategy: "I must show what happens to me as if it didn't happen to me, or as if it were not true or, finally, as if it happened to someone else" (168).12 If this is a false characterization of Brecht's idea of alienation, it is an apt formulation of umorismo, and becomes even more illuminating, I suggest, when recast in psychological terms: in the specular moment, when the unconscious is engaged, the Self spies something foreign and other in itself, and resorts to a number of distancing mechanisms, the most common in Pirandello's case being a kind of detached mirth in the face of high anxiety. As we shall see, Pirandello's goal in L'umorismo is to show that this estrangement has a crucial function in the artistic process.
The operative mechanism of umorismo is a faculty Pirandello calls riflessione which spontaneously reflects, or mirrors, the various competing and contradicting sentiments in the artist's mind. The creative result is a unitary work of art which expresses incoherence. Ultimately, one could argue that Pirandellian art is not about representing objective reality, but is a means for represent- Humorist art, which acknowledges the split Self and the fundamentally irrational character of the psyche, is organized by principles diametrically opposed to those governing traditional art.
Here, and throughout his essay, Pirandello argues that the humorist's art (i.e., his own) is more compelling than traditional efforts precisely because it incorporates the inner struggle that informs the Self.
At this point, one might ask how Pirandello understands the nature of the split? In other words, what message does the unconscious wish to send, by means of riflessione, and why does the conscious mind ordinarily try to repress the message at all costs? Armed with Freudian theory, one could surmise that taboo desires and castration anxieties, such as those which give rise to the Oedipus complex, are relegated to the unconscious, and that these desires and anxieties are the message. But Pirandello, pre-Freudian that he is, only knows that the unconscious "appare orrido nella sua crudezza impassibile e misteriosa" [appears horrid in its impassive, mysterious harshness]; that it is "un vuoto strano, come un arresto del tempo e della vita, come se il nostro silenzio interiore si sprofondasse negli abissi del mistero" [a strange void, like a stoppage of time or life, as if an interior silence plunged us into mysterious abysses]; that underneath consciousness "c'e qualcos'altro, a cui l'uomo non puo affacciarsi, se non a costo di morire o d'impazzire" [there is something else which man cannot face, except at the cost of death or madness] (153). We might well say that at the center of Pirandello's art are a mysterious void and a looming threat of madness. Italo Svevo, by contrast, is Freudian in his conception of consciousness. In La coscienza di Zeno [The Confessions of Zeno], Zeno's behavior is hardly a mystery to us: we know that his obsessive behaviors arise from profound oedipal anxieties; we know, for example, that his sublimated desire for his mother drives him to smoke obsessively because he unconsciously associates cigarettes with his father's phallic power. Unlike Svevo's playful resignation, Pirandello's humor, as we shall see in Ilfu Mattia Pascal, is marked by a frenetic and insistent search for the Self. * * *
The Pirandellian mirror is the first-person narrator's most important tool for self-discovery in Ilfu Mattia Pascal, written just four years before the essay on humor. This is the tale of a fellow with a lazy eye (amblyopia, in medical parlance) who leaves home, only to return, and who, when thought dead, takes the opportunity to change his identity, only to attempt unsuccessfully to reclaim it. Clearly, Mattia's journey of return is not only real but also psychological. Read this way, the novel is a bildungsroman of dysfunction because it renders impossible the coherent formation of Mattia's personality.'4
From the outset, he is a happy-go-lucky fellow, even though he has suffered personal tragedies like the death of his father and the robbery of his inheritance by the unscrupulous Malagna. Eventually, an extremely disagreeable mother-in-law (Marianna Pescatore), an impetuous aunt, his pregnant wife's morning sickness and financial difficulties all contribute to Mattia's crisis, speeding his entry into the painful world of adulthood. His "maturazione" ["ripening"], the title of the novel's fifth chapter, is nearly complete when he comes to believe in the need for laughter in confronting adversity. After a brawl involving his motherin-law's sharp finger nails and some very sticky bread dough, Mattia is transformed and now able to laugh at his troubles by viewing them with an almost neurotic sense of detachment, as if he is watching these ills befall someone else.
Posso dire che da allora ho fatto il gusto a ridere di tutte le mie sciagure e d'ogni mio tormento. Mi vide [my italics], in quell'istante, attore d'una tragedia che piu buffa non si sarebbe potuta immaginare: mia madre, scappata via, cosi, con quella matta [his aunt]; mia moglie di la, che . .. lasciamola stare!; Marianna Pescatore, li per terra; e io, io che non avevo piu pane, quel che si dice pane, per il giorno appresso, io con la barba tutta impastocchiata, il viso sgraffiato, grondante non sapevo ancora se di sangue o di lagrime per il troppo ridere. Andai ad accertarmene allo specchio. Erano lagrime; ma ero anche sgraffiato bene. Ah quel mio occhio, in quel momento, quanto mi piacque! Per disperato, mi s'era messo a guardare piu che mai altrove per conto suo.
[I can say that, from then on, I took pleasure in laughing at all of my calamities and torments. In that instant, I saw myself an actor in the most comic tragedy that was ever imagined: my mother, gone, just like that, with that nut [his aunt]; my wife over there, who ... leave her be! Marianna Pescatore, there on the floor; and I, who had not the next day's bread, neither literally nor figuratively, but a flour-covered beard and a scratched face, moist I did not yet know with blood or tears from too much laughter. I went to the mirror to find out: it was tears but I was also badly scratched. In that moment, my eye pleased me to no end! Out of desperation, it began, on its own accord, to gaze about more than ever.] (361)
In keeping with Pirandello's privileging of vision over the other senses, Mattia develops his humorist perceptions while standing before a mirror, the literal site ofriflessione, where he thoroughly objectifies himself. Since he is narrating events forever fixed in the past, there is at play here a second mirror as well, or perhaps one could call it a spyglass of temporal distance. Imagining himself an actor in a "tragedia . .. buffa" [comic tragedy], complete with grotesque blood and flour make-up, he re-presents his life as though it were a theatrical scene and, consequently, adds yet another layer of perception that further undermines the gravity of the situation and distances the narrator from his story. Pirandello would have us believe that umorismo, in rendering visible a previously unobserved gulf between our experiences and our interpretation of them, creates nothing less than a new genre which occupies the shadowy, paradoxical space between tragedy and comedy. If the mind is like a cracked mirror, art must represent the multiple shards of the Self. Thus Mattia's aberrant eye, which focuses where ever it pleases, acts as a physical manifestation of the split Self, giving the character a kind of double vision that mimics the effects of riflessione.'5 Pirandellian self-consciousness is precisely this: not merely living, but watching oneself live with an objectifying detachment, as if with an eye not quite one's own.
However, at this point in the novel Mattia is not a fully mature humorist in that he does not yet accept the inevitability of the split Self and the resultant self-estrangement. He attempts to flee his family and adopt another identity, becoming Adriano, only to finally admit his inability to escape from his incoherent, conflicted Self. Though Adriano may be viewed as Mattia's double, or mirror image, he never amounts to more than a detour through the problem of one's outward, social identity on Mattia's road back to the more pressing concern over self-perception. In my view, against most readings of the text, the social and legal circumstances prompting Adriano/Mattia's decision to return home are not determinate but only plot expedients. Indeed, the question of social norms, and whether one can live outside them, seems trivial in comparison to Pirandello's engagement with the turn-of-the-century debate about the nature and integrity of the Self. To serve Pirandello's ends, Mattia's journey must conclude in his hometown where the problems of self-representation are most insistently interrogated. By the end of the story, the "late" Mattia Pascal, who virtually lives outside society, is the perfect incarnation of the Pirandellian humorist-artist. Now resigned to the inherently fragmented nature of human identity, and conscious of his dual status as Self and Other, Mattia is able to act as both narrator and the focal point of his own humorist scrutiny within the novel's autobiographical structure. However, Mattia's brand of self-knowledge does not lead to closure, as it would in canonical nineteenth-century novels like Ipromessi sposi, whose maturing protagonists purportedly come to know themselves more profoundly and to recognize Truth. In fact, Pirandello's work forcefully rejects the realist project by demonstrating that the late nineteenth-century rise of philosophical relativism is firmly tied to the insoluble problem of self-representation. If we exclude Pirandello's attempt to map out a literary history of humor, L'umorismo is well-conceived and describes very closely the important qualities of the author's fictional works. However, there are a number of points where the essay is inconsistent in its theoretical presentation. I will discuss just one inconsistency as a means of summarizing my own claims for umorismo. The most often cited pages in the entire essay, which attempt to explain with precision the mechanism of umorismo, are also some of the most misleading. Here, Pirandello defines the comic as "l'awertimento del contrario" ["the perception of the opposite"], the awareness that something is not as it appears to be, or as it should be. By contrast, when riflessione is in operation, the humorist-artist brings human compassion and sympathy to the situation; he or she does not merely laugh but cries as well, thereby reaching "il sentimento del contrario" ["the sentiment of the opposite"] (127). Pirandello's famous example here is the vecchia signora [old lady] who tries most unconvincingly to look young, so that she might sustain the love of her much younger husband. We laugh at how ridiculous the signora looks, but, Pirandello explains, if we put her individual predicament in the context of the human condition, (that we all grow old and die, that we all need love) then we can not help but sympathize with her. Thus, umorismo seems to stake out a high moral ground in its insistence on sympathy and compassion.
This analysis of Ilfu Mattia Pascal invites us to consider in
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However, what remains unsaid about this famous example is that it fails in nearly every respect to capture the essence of umorismo as Pirandello practices it in Ilfu Mattia Pascal and elsewhere. In fact, Pirandello's art seldom emphasizes a moralizing sympathy for the tribulations of others, and seldom turns on the ability of Pirandello's characters to identify profoundly with the Other.18 On the contrary, I have argued that riflessione is a mechanism for detachment and distancing, and that the sight of the Other inside the Self leads to estrangement. Thus, in this conception of the Self, the external Other is only secondary. There is plenty of unintended irony in Pirandello's seizing on a figure, the signora, with whom he hardly identifies, when Mattia Pascal is estranged from himself, the person with whom he can most closely identify. Recall that in the moment of Mattia's identity crisis, the women in his tortured life (i.e., pregnant wife, motherin-law, aunt and mother) appear to be the source of his alienation: his flight from home is spurred by an inability to negotiate the female world which engulfs him. More compelling than Pirandello's claim that umorismo demands a sympathetic response is Maggie Giinsberg's assertion that, subtextually at least, the signora functions as an abhorrent figure of "the post-menopausal woman" (9). In any event, it should be stressed that the true Pirandellian drama is interior: in the case of the signora, it would unfold if we, as the audience or readers, witnessed her psychological decomposition as she scrutinized her image, struggling with the fact that her self-representation is a rather shabby and unconvincing work of art.
But one might well ask if Pirandello could apply his mirror principle to the signora or any woman. Since in the Western tradition the image of woman is the image of the Other par excellence, can it also be the image of the Self? Luce Irigaray, an influential theoretician of psychoanalytic feminism, weighs in against that possibility when she states that "we can assume that any theory of the subject has been appropriated by the masculine" (133). In other words, a dominant, male perspective tends to devise false universals, ignoring the probability that woman is psychologically different from man, that her relationship to the Other might be complicated by a deep sense that she is the Other. Elaborating on this male solipsism, Irigaray argues that "The Copernican revolution has yet to have its final effects in the male imaginary" (133). Indeed, the obsession of umorismo with the internal Other, with what Irigaray calls "his other," seems to support her claim that the male subject, be it Pirandello's, Freud's or Lacan's, is not fully de-centered and fractured after all.
The [male] subject henceforth will be multiple, plural, sometimes di-formed, but it will still postulate itself as the cause of all the mirages that can be enumerated endlessly and therefore put back together again as one. A fantastic phantasmatic fragmentation. A destruc(tura)tion in which the "subject" is shattered, scuttled, while still claiming surreptitiously that he is the reason for it all. detto altrove, e qui m'r forza ripetere-l'opera d'arte ^ creata dal libero movimento della vita interiore che organa le idee e le immagini in una forma armoniosa, di cui tutti gli elementi han corrispondenza tra loro e con l'idea-madre che le coordina. ... La coscienza, in somma, non e una potenza creatrice, ma lo specchio interiore in cui il pensiero si rimira; si puo dire anzi ch'essa sia il pensiero che vede se stesso, assistendo a quello che esso fa spontaneamente. E, d'ordinario, nell'artista, nel momento della concezione, la riflessione si nasconde, resta, per cos" dire, invisible: e, quasi, per l'artista una forma del sentimento" (126).
14 Luperini, 59. 15 The question of vision is clearly more metaphorical than real. As a child, Mattia is forced to wear glasses in order to straighten out his wandering eye, but he cannot stand it. "Erano per me, quegli occhiali, un vero martirio. A un certo punto, li buttai via e lasciai libero l'occhio di guardare dove gli piacesse meglio" (333). Mattia's fragmented perception is an intergal part of his character that cannot be cured. 16 Consider, as well, Dombroski's analysis: "The story Moscarda tells revolves around a fundamental principle: the position of the subject as the object of analysis and the ongoing process of verifying the radically divergent relationship between the narrative 'I and the Other-the 'you' whom Moscarda continually addresses" (381).
17
Anglophone readers have missed the psychological dimensions of this passage, and of the play as a whole, because the most widely available translation, Eric Bentley's, translates "coscienza" as "conscience" leaving the reader to surmise that mere moral weakness is at the center of Pirandello's drama (231). 18 As an example of the supposed sympathy engendered by riflessione, Pirandello erroneously claims that Giuseppe Giusti's poem, "Sant'Ambrogio," is a fine instance of umorismo because the poet's hatred of the occupying Austrian soldiers is tempered by his realization that they are also "poveretti addogliati e derisi" (158; see also 128-9). While the poem underscores the fact that human affairs are never black and white, "Sant'Ambrogio" can hardly be said to decompose our perceptions of consciousness in the manner that Pirandello's works do. 
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